Who decides to go to war? Elites and public opinion

Who decides to go to war? In almost every modern conflict, the decision rests with a very small circle: a head of state, a handful of ministers, a few generals. Yet the war is fought and endured by millions who had no part in that decision — and who often bore no hostility at all towards the people on the other side. This article examines that paradox through four historical cases and the main theories that try to explain it, while keeping an uncomfortable fact in view: the public often backs the war too, at least at first.

Four case studies

1. July 1914: a few men and a continent at war

The crisis that led to the First World War was settled in five weeks in a handful of offices in Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg, Paris and London. In The Sleepwalkers (2012), Christopher Clark portrays leaders who did not necessarily want a general war but made it possible through a chain of decisions; the school of Fritz Fischer, by contrast, placed greater responsibility on Germany's elites. Both accounts agree on the essential point: very few people decided.

And the famous popular enthusiasm of August 1914? Historian Jeffrey Verhey showed that Germany's 'spirit of 1914' was largely urban and middle-class, while anxiety prevailed in the countryside and in working-class districts. The international socialist movement, which had pledged to oppose war, collapsed: Jean Jaurès was assassinated on 31 July, and the German SPD voted for war credits on 4 August. A few months later, the Christmas truce of 1914 saw British and German soldiers fraternising in no man's land.

2. Yugoslavia in the 1990s: manufactured hatred

The popular explanation of the Yugoslav wars speaks of 'ancient hatreds'. Political scientist V. P. Gagnon argued the opposite in The Myth of Ethnic War (2004): political elites — Slobodan Milošević above all — stoked ethnic fear to demobilise those who threatened their power, in a country where mixed marriages were common in many cities. Others, such as Barry Posen, stress the 'security dilemma' that arises when a state disintegrates. The debate remains open, but the role of controlled media and of political leaders is extensively documented, including in judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

3. The Falklands, 1982: a war to save a regime?

Argentina's military junta seized the islands in April 1982, amid economic crisis and growing protests. The 'diversionary war' hypothesis holds that it sought to unite the country behind a national cause; many historians find this plausible while debating its weight against other factors, such as the mistaken belief that Britain would not respond. The Rattenbach Report, produced by Argentina's own armed forces, harshly criticised the junta's conduct of the war. The invasion was greeted with jubilation in Buenos Aires — another sign that popular support can follow a decision rather than precede it.

4. Iraq, 2003: millions in the streets, a decision in few hands

On 15 February 2003, millions marched against the invasion of Iraq in cities around the world, among them London, Rome, Madrid and New York. Spain's government gave the war its political backing although polls at the time showed majority opposition. In Britain, the Chilcot Report (2016) concluded that the UK joined the invasion before peaceful options had been exhausted, and that judgments about weapons of mass destruction were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

The decision to go to war almost always belongs to a few; the price is almost always paid by many.

Editorial summary

What the theories say

• Rationalist explanations: James Fearon (1995) argued that wars break out because of incomplete information, commitment problems or indivisible stakes — even between leaders who would prefer a deal.
• Selectorate theory: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (2003) hold that leaders decide with an eye on the coalition that keeps them in power; the smaller it is, the less they care about the cost to the population.
• Democratic peace: the observation that democracies rarely fight each other, popularised by Michael Doyle in 1983, suggests domestic checks do restrain some wars.
• Rally-round-the-flag: John Mueller (1973) showed that support for a leader tends to rise at the start of an international crisis, which can reward risky decisions.
• Diversionary war: the idea that governments use foreign conflict to mask domestic trouble has some basis, but Jack Levy warned in 1989 that the empirical evidence is mixed.

Who holds war powers by law

The United States last formally declared war in 1942. Almost every intervention since has gone ahead without one, strengthening the executive at the expense of legislatures.

A caveat: the people are not always peaceful

It would be a mistake to turn this into a tale of wicked elites and innocent peoples. Popular nationalism has sometimes pushed leaders forward, propaganda works because it finds fertile ground, and many wars enjoyed broad support at the outset. Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon noted in 2007 that certain psychological biases, such as overconfidence, tend to favour the more hawkish voices within decision-making circles. The question is not only who decides, but what checks exist to make that decision answer for itself.

Conclusion

Modern war is decided by a small group, legitimised by propaganda and sustained — for a while — by public support. When that support runs out, as it did in Russia in 1917 or in the unpopular wars of the 20th century, the gap between those who decide and those who fight becomes politically explosive. Understanding these mechanisms is the best way to insist that decisions for war are held to account.